Air Navigation Service Providers (ANSPs) as the third major component of the aviation industry have been less of a focus in research than their airline and airport counterparts. In this paper we analyse European ANSPs cost structures using a stochastic frontier analysis approach within a Bayesian estimation framework in order to incorporate regularity conditions. Our results show that ownership is not directly impacting neither the ANSPs cost structures nor their cost efficiencies and that the European ANSPs are operating on the increasing return to scale part of the technology, hence supporting the choice of ANSPs agglomeration.
Introduction
Air Navigation Service Providers (ANSPs) are the third major component within the aviation industry, connecting the other two components; airlines and airports through their provision of air navigation services (ANS) whilst ensuring the safety of operations and the promotion of efficient traffic flows. ANSPs are entities providing both air traffic control (ATC) and air navigation services (ANS) collectively referred to as air traffic management (ATM) (Oster and Strong, 2007) . ANSPs offer en-route, approach and aerodrome control air traffic services. Many also offer oceanic ANS and some provide services to civil and military aviation. As a result, ANS can account for between five and ten percent of airlines operating costs, with delays generating significant costs to the airlines (Quendt et al., 2007) . Considering this, it is recognised that improvements for the enhancement of flight and airspace efficiencies will facilitate significant cost savings within the industry (McDougall and Roberts, 2008) . Historically, ANSPs have been owned and controlled by their respective governments. However, there is a trend towards separation from the government and a commercialisation of the ANSP organisations, with many ANSPs world-wide having moved from the traditional governmental departments and agencies towards various different organisational forms with some degree of commercial focus within their service provision. This is often a result of increasing financial constraints faced by governments, increased congestion and outdated equipment and facilities. As such within Europe, several ANSPs have undergone institutional reform to become commercialised allowing them to generate internal improvements and liberating them from governmental budgetary controls which in turn should enable benefits and efficiencies for the airspace users. Most ANSPs have already diversified into non-core business activities, with some explicitly stating intentions of expanding such activities. As such, it is interesting to determine the impact, if any, that the commercialisation, privatisation and resultant non-core business activities may have upon the cost-efficiencies which they seek. A number of publications and studies have tried to assess the contribution which privatisation and commercialisation can have on the provision of ANS both within Europe and world-wide. For example, Lewis and Zolin (2004) undertook a comparative analysis of the institutional arrangements for governance of several global ANSPs ascertaining that privatisation is directly related to the ANSP's ability to respond to user needs. They suggest that privatisation should lead to the improvement of financial performances, safety and efficiency. Button and McDougall (2006) indicate that in the long-term, ANSP commercialisation results in reductions in charges levied on customers, achieved through competition. Their study suggests that commercialisation often leads to improvements of service portfolios and provides flexibility. Similar results are provided in McDougall and Roberts (2008) ; the authors suggest that ANSP commercialisation generally achieves service quality improvements, modernisation of technologies, financial stability and high safety levels. When turning the attention towards ANSP cost efficiency, few studies have tried to analyse the European air navigation system. EUROCONTROL, a European regulation body providing member states with guidance to achieving safe, efficient and environmentally sound air traffic services, 1 produces a benchmark analysis of ANSPs. They publish reports which monitor performance and targets for improvements, including the annual Air Traffic Management Cost Effectiveness (ACE) benchmarking report which mainly compares ANSPs on financial and economic gate-to-gate key performance indicators. Besides these reports, EUROCONTROL performance review unit (PRU) commission studies on the efficiency of air navigation systems such as those by Mouchart and Simar (2003) , NERA Economic Consulting (2006) and Cobb Douglas total cost stochastic frontier analysis. Despite problems of estimation convergence, the report shows an average level of inefficiency ranging from 13% to 60%, as a function of the assumption with respect to the inefficiency distribution. Besides these works, few other researchers benchmarked European ANSPs applying a data envelopment approach (e.g., Neiva, 2014, Bilotkach et al., 2015) . Generally, no research has been undertaken in order to connect ownership and efficiency by showing the influence that ownership and institutional structure has upon ANSP (cost)
efficiency. The aim of this research is to fill this gap in the literature. By adopting a stochastic frontier approach, we evaluate the impact of ownership over the ANSPs cost structures and cost efficiencies.
We estimate the cost functions (total cost and variable cost) within a Bayesian framework in order to incorporate regularity conditions following the economics theory. By satisfying the economics regularity assumptions, our estimates are therefore providing useful information to the regulator in regards to industry elasticities and economies of scale. Commission deciding on common regulatory approaches and they oversee implementation at national level, with a focus on performance regulations to stimulate ANSP cost-efficiency and service quality.
European ANSPs
As an example, prior to 2012 the ANSP charges were regulated under full cost-recovery mechanisms resulting in increased charges following any revenue shortfalls and with any profits redistributed to the airspace users (European Commission, 2010). In accordance with the more recent regulation 1191/2010, ANSPs are now not guaranteed to cover their costs and they have incentives to be efficient given the possibility of retaining profits. However, despite being directed by rules and business pressures prescribed by EUROCONTROL, ANSPs within Europe still differ significantly.
Each ANSP has duties mandated by laws unique to them, with governments providing different definitions and responsibilities of their respective ANSPs. Almost all ANSPs are engaged in both core and non-core business activities, however, the extent to which varies across each ANSP.
ANSPs Privatisation and Commercialisation
It is possible to recognise three main ANSP ownership and institutional structures: state entities, Another reason which identified the need for ownership reform was recognition that there was a direct conflict between the needs of ATC customers, politicians, industry and lobbies. Commercialisation is recognised by many advocates as a powerful catalyst for promoting collaboration between airspace users. Furthermore, it was considered necessary to separate service provision from economic and safety regulation as state civil aviation authorities were often regulating their competitors (Majumdar, 1995) . A prime reason to move towards an ANSP entity separated from the government is to free the organisation from government funding and management constraints, enabling the required high levels of investment for the inherent technological dependency of ANSPs and to ensure that growing traffic levels can be safely controlled without resultant delays (Majumdar, 1995 Indeed, in the case of natural monopolies (or geographical monopolies as for ANSPs), the only factor that appears to be relevant to impact efficiencies is the regulatory policy framework. Another significant problem in the trend towards privatisation and commercialisation is the political will of governments to allow independence of the ANSP. Governments are concerned about losing revenue and political influence that it can levy over ANS provision. An argument against privatisation and commercialisation is that government owned and controlled ANSP services allow budgets to be managed more simply, furthermore, the absence of commercial pressures ensures the removal of distraction from the core services. As a public service, significant ATC service failures would be catastrophic to respective countries. As such despite handing operational responsibility, assets and infrastructure to external parties, governments with privatised ANSPs still assume costs and ultimate responsibility to ensure continuous service.
Methodology
In order to study the impact of ownership on cost it is necessary to firstly define the ANSP's cost functions. Given the high variability of air traffic growth, ANSPs are constantly exposed to unanticipated traffic changes. Even if ANSPs are able to adjust inputs (at least to a certain degree) by accelerating or decelerating staff training and recruitment, this may not be valid when managing airspace capacity. During periods of low demand, it is not practical or sensible for ANSPs to cut capacity in order to save costs while, on the contrary, capacity enhancements are generally managed by long-term, capital intensive projects. Equation (1) describes a variable cost approach assuming the inability to fully adjust the input mix in the short run hence considering the capital as a quasi-fixed variable:
where the variable costs (VC) are a function of the set of input prices (W), the outputs (Y), the capital stock (K) and a set of variables capturing the heterogeneity of the ANSPs (Z). Equation (1) by construction is only analysing the variable costs hence describing the cost of operating the capacity and the amount of capacity provided. By estimating a total cost function equation (2) 
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The total costs (TC) are a function of a set of input prices including the price for the capital (W), the outputs (Y) and a set of set of variables controlling for heterogeneity (Z). We estimate the cost function (1) and (2) within a stochastic frontier framework, hence including inefficiencies as deviations from the optimal cost minimiser function:
Where, represents the deviation from the theoretical cost function due to inefficiency and is the estimation random error. Due to its flexibility, we apply a translog as the function form ( ) (in order to compare the results with the existing studies, in Appendix B we provide the results when using a Cobb-Douglas function). In order to evaluate the impact of ownership on the ANSP costs, we use two are deemed to influence the units' efficiency, it is possible to implement the approach proposed by Koop et al. (1997) . More precisely, it is possible to estimate equations (4a) and (4b) by assuming the covariates ( ) to affect the posterior mean of the inefficiency term distribution as:
Estimating equations (4a and 4b) it is possible to analyse the impact of the ownership on the ANSP cost structures. Estimating the inefficiencies as in equation (5), it is possible to analyse the direct impact of ownership on the cost efficiencies (i.e. including the ownership variables in the inefficiency distribution). 2 Both in the case of equations (4) and (5), the environmental variables do not interact with the inputs or the time. Therefore, frontier shape, input-output and substitution elasticities are not influenced by the environment. In order to be consistent with the economics theory and to provide reliable estimations, the cost function needs to satisfy the property of non-negativity in costs, homogeneity, monotonicity in output and input prices and concavity. The homogeneity condition can be implemented by simply normalising the input prices and the variable costs by one of the input prices, while monotonicity and concavity are more difficult to impose. The most common approach is to estimate the model without imposing these two conditions only assessing the severity of the constraints violations; however, this practice could lead to distorted parameter estimates (e.g. as shown in Chua et al., 2005) . Different viable implementation alternatives are indicated in literature (some examples include Wales, 1998 and 2000) , in our work we use the accept/reject algorithm proposed by Terrell (1996) . The method locally imposes monotonicity and concavity by assigning zero weights to the parameter vectors leading to monotonicity and concavity violations. The estimations of equations (4) and (5) As total costs (TC) we use the ATM/CNS provision costs, while as variable costs (VC) the ATM/CNS provision costs less the depreciation costs and the cost of capital. Using data related to ATM/CNS, we focus our study on ANSPs regulated activities. We consider a unique output (Y) computed as the composite flight hours controlled. This measure is a weighted sum of en-route flight hours controlled and the number of instrumental flight rule airport movements controlled and it is commonly used in ANSPs benchmarking. The input price vector includes the price for air traffic controllers ATCOs (W1), the price for non-operational staff (W2), and the price for non-staff operating inputs (W3). W1
and W2 are computed as the relative costs divided by the relative full time equivalent (FTE) numbers.
The non-staff operating input is a "catch all costs" category, including energy, spare parts, We include a vector of exogenous variables developed by EUROCONTROL describing the total area controlled by the ANSP (Z1), the airspace complexity (Z2) and the traffic variability (Z3). The area controlled captures the network characteristics and can be used to compute economies of scale. The airspace complexity (composed by the adjusted density and the structural complexity) and the traffic variability (computed as traffic at the peak week divided by the traffic in the average week) are used to control traffic characteristics. 7 Finally, a set of dummy variables representing the ownership structures of the ANSPs are added to study the effect of ownership; private (D1), commercialised 5 The net book value provided by EUROCONTROL is reported by each of the ANPSs and could be affected by inconsistencies due to the different depreciation rules between countries. 6 In our study we used the producer price index sourced from Eurostat. 7 Detailed information regarding the metrics can be found in the report "complexity metrics for ANSP benchmarking analysis" (2006) . indicators to enable comparisons across countries. In total we consider a slightly unbalanced dataset of 330 observations over nine years. Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics for the sample in the last year under observation (2014). However, due to the relatively small magnitude of these NBV this effect is negligible when analysing 8 For examples, the NBV of Albania changes from 29M to 40M of euros, the NBV of Armenia from 5M to 9M, while in Estonia from 10M to 18M. the capital variable (K). Finally, Figure 1c presents the average increase of composite hours in relation to the average change in traffic characteristics (i.e. complexity and variability). Generally, variability index shows a small change during the period (+4%) in line with the change in composite flight hours (+5%). The average complexity shows a greater increase during the period (+18%). are based on 100,000 draws with a thinning to every fifth draw after a burn-in of 50,000 iterations.
The non-staff operating price (W3) is used as a normalisation variable to implement homogeneity. All of the variables (except for the dummies and the time trend) are mean corrected prior to the estimation, thus the elasticities of cost with respect to the factor prices are equivalent to shares in costs at the average observation. Table 2 shows the variable cost function estimated parameters (i.e. posterior mean), the standard deviation and the 95% confidence interval for the two specifications (specification 4a and specification 5, respectively). The estimates for an additional 50,000 draws (Appendix C) and the posterior densities (obtainable upon request to the authors) show the estimations convergence. 
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The two models show a relatively low lambda hence a relatively high inefficiency variance. This implies that a large part of the deviations from the cost minimising function is due to inefficiency and that the choice of a stochastic frontier approach is correct. The average estimated efficiency for the industry is relatively low, 38% -for Model 4VC, 37% -for Model 5VC. Comparing the two models, Table 3 shows the total cost function estimated parameters (i.e. posterior mean), the standard deviation and the 95% confidence interval for the two specifications (equation 4b and equation 5, respectively). For consistency, as for the previous estimations the following was considered; i) we use the same prior distributions for the parameters, ii) estimates are based on 100,000 iterations with a thinning of 5 with a burn-in of 50,000 iterations, and iii) we use W3 as normalisation variable. 
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Most of the comments of table 2 are valid for the total cost function results. The models show a relatively low lambda hence a moderately high inefficiency variance, the estimates are similar and show the expected signs. The average estimated efficiency for the industry is still relatively low, around 33% for both the models. In Model 4TC, at the sample mean the ATCOs labour (W1) accounts for 38% of total costs, non-operational labour (W2) accounts for 36%, capital (W4) accounts for 18% and materials (W3) represents the remaining 8%. Similar results can be depicted in Model 5TC with the only small difference in W4 (20%) and consequently in W3 (6%). Shares in costs are similar to those obtained by the Competition Analysis Group (2012) (our estimates are slightly higher in the labour variable) and substantially different from the estimates of NERA (2006) (mainly in the non-ATCOs share which is accounting for almost 50% of total costs). 11 An increase of 1% of the output (Y) implies an increase of around 0.05 % of total costs in both models 4TC and 5TC (almost five times less than the impact on variable costs). The time parameters ( and * ) show weak significance, suggesting that the total costs are not changing during the period analysed, ceteris paribus. The estimate of eta ( ) shows a non significant improvement in the total cost efficiencies. As for the variable cost estimates, complexity (Z2) and variability (Z3) are not significant, while an increase in the area controlled (Z1) increases the total costs (we notice that these results are shared with previous studies, despite the differences in period analysed). A possible explanation for complexity and variability not baring significance may result from these two variables by nature concerning themselves with only en-route stages of flight, whereas this study concerns itself with gate-to-gate costs. Even when considering long-term cost functions, the ownership variables are not significant either as determinants of the cost structure or as cost-efficiency explanatories. Figure 3 shows the kernel distribution for the posterior densities of the economies of scale at the sample mean.
Results show the average ANSP lying on the increasing economies of scales part of the technology, an increase of 1% in composite flight hours and Area controlled may lead to a less than proportional increase of 0.46% (Model 4TC) and 0.48% (Model 5TC) in total costs. 
5) Discussion
The estimated models show that the ownership structures do not impact neither the cost structure nor the cost efficiency of European ANSPs. These results are in line with the work of Vickers and Yarrow (1991), which showed that regulation is more important than privatisation to achieve efficiencies within a monopolistic context. In the specific case of ANSPS, there are numerous reasons which provide possible explanations to these findings. Generally, all ANSPs must operate in accordance with common regulations and frameworks such as those determined by EURCONTROL. Given the environment within which the European ANSPs must operate such as the SES (which already looks to ensure cost-efficiencies despite the ownership structure), it is arguably difficult for private sector employees to further enhance the ANSPs' cost efficiencies or in general to reduce costs. Irrespective of ownership, all ANSPs must ensure safety as the top priority, therefore they are strictly regulated and cannot reduce head count of ATCOs or technology levels (the two most expensive factors).
Another possible explanation is that whilst having secured a degree of autonomy from their respective governments, behaviours are culturally driven and despite ANSPs being commercialised, they often still function in practical terms as a public entity (i.e. 100% government owned and operating under government control). 
Conclusions
This article has looked to investigate whether the institutional structures of ANSPs have an impact on their relative costs (variable and total) or on their cost-efficiencies. In order to do so, this work applied a cost stochastic frontier approach to a set of 37 European ANSPs for the period 2006-2014. To satisfy the economics regularity conditions we estimated the functions applying Terrell (1996) algorithm within a Bayesian framework. Using the estimated functions, we then analysed the industry elasticities and returns to scale. Our main results have indicated that ownership and institutional structure does not have any influence upon ANSP cost-efficiencies or upon their cost structures.
Whilst this study uses data for a seemingly large timeframe, between 2006 and 2014, arguably, the industry is relatively slow at adapting and as such nine years is possibly not a long enough timeframe to discern long-term trends or ascertain the evolution of the industry in regard to the impact that ownership and institutional structure has on cost-efficiency and cost-structure. This is particularly evidenced through some commercialised ANSPs adapting to their new institutional reforms and still behaving as public entities. The creation of boards to manage ANSPs, represent users and acknowledge the government's ultimate responsibilities in regards to ANS delivery is a way in which ANSPs can ensure appropriate distributions of responsibilities enabling a clearer definition between the entity and the government, reducing ambiguity. Moreover, our results show that the air navigation service providers are lying on the increasing part of the technology with the economies of scale greater when capital is considered as a freely available input (i.e. in a total cost function framework).
Our results highlight the importance of increasing the average size of the ANSPs in order to decrease the relative costs, hence supporting the agglomeration process proposed in the SES initiative. Future research could extend this study to ANSPs worldwide considering a wider range of ownership structures. However, potential difficulties (partially already present within the European analysis) may be the availability of data due to different accounting rules and exogenous factors measurements (e.g. airspace complexity indices). Moreover, the research agenda may be focused on the non-regulated, commercially driven aspects of the privatised and commercialised ANSPs. Studies on ANSPs profit maximisation behaviours may complete the analysis in regards to the institutional and ownership reform.
fifth draw after a burn-in of 50,000 iterations. In Model 5TC, Lambda 2 and Lambda 3 (i.e. D1=1 and D2=1, respectively) are 0.643and 0.589.
